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The Role of the Consulates
In the prewar era there were four Chinese consulates in Malaya. In 1877 Hu
Xuan Ze (also known as Hoo Ah Kay [Hu Ya Ji]), an overseas Chinese, was
appointed consul in Singapore. Four years later (in 1881) a permanent consu-
late was established in Singapore and upgraded to consulate general status in
1891.1 Other Chinese consulates were opened in Penang in 1893,2 in Api in
1913, and in Kuala Lumpur in 1933.3 The consulate in Api was relocated to
Sandakan in 1933. In the postwar era, China reopened its consulate general
and other consulates early in 1946, though the consulate in Sandakan was
again relocated to Api (present-day Kota Kinabalu). In 1948 new consulates
were opened in Kuching (in Sarawak), Ipoh, and Malacca. In February 1948,
the Federation of Malaya was created, but Singapore did not join and re-
mained as a British Crown Colony. In the circumstances the Kuala Lumpur
consulate was upgraded to consulate general status to head the Chinese diplo-
matic organizations in the new federation (see Appendix 1). As a result, China
had two consulates general and five consulates in the Malayan region from
August 1948 onwards. This situation continued until January 1950 when all
of the consulates were closed after the United Kingdom recognized the new
government of mainland China (the People’s Republic). In contrast with
today’s  situation  where  China’s  only  representation  in  Malaysia  is  its
embassy in the capital, China’s consuls were able to undertake a wide range
of activities in those days.
After taking office as consul general in Singapore in February 1946, Dr.
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Wu Paak Shing (Wu Bo Sheng) undertook fact-finding visits to various parts
of Malaya. During these visits, he was enthusiastically welcomed by local
Chinese associations. When the consul general arrived in Kuala Lumpur on
May 4, a local newspaper, the Min Sheng Pao (the de facto organ of the
Malayan Communist Party [MCP]), carried an editorial welcoming him as
“the representative of our homeland.” It urged the consul general to find solu-
tions for the problems facing all the overseas Chinese irrespective of their
political belief and called for solidarity in the Chinese community. Appar-
ently even the MCP looked upon China as the homeland in this period, and
the Chinese consul, even though he represented the Kuomintang government,
was seen as a vital source of aid and protection in times of difficulty.
The principal postwar activities of the consulate general and consulates in
Malaya were as outlined below.
I. Recording Human and Material Losses during the Japanese
Occupation
As soon as they were reopened after the war, the consulate general in Singapore
and the consulate in Kuala Lumpur initiated an audit of damage and losses
suffered during the Japanese occupation. This process continued until August
1947. The report sent to the Chinese Foreign Ministry recorded 4,522 cases
of injury and death and property losses totaling U.S.$29,002,861.55 just in
the area covered by the consulate general (Singapore, Johor, Malacca,
Terengganu, Kelantan, Sarawak).4 In the period to the end of September 1947,
the consulate general also surveyed the circumstances of the families of Chi-
nese killed during the occupation. This survey was also the subject of a report
to the Chinese Foreign Ministry.5 However, China’s Kuomintang government
ultimately waived any claim for reparations from Japan, with the result that
this record of losses and damages was never used. Nor are there any reports
that the consulate general or consulates provided any financial assistance to
victims on the basis of this record and survey. (The demands of victims for
financial relief is discussed in endnote 44 of Chapter 1.)
II. Demand for War-Crimes Tribunals over the Murdering of
Overseas Chinese by the Japanese Military
War criminals were put on trial between 1946 and 1948. It was the overseas
Chinese themselves who exerted the strongest pressure on the Allied Forces
to punish those responsible for massacres of overseas Chinese. The families
of victims formed organizations in areas where massacres had occurred to
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track down those responsible and provide mutual assistance. These included
the Joint Appeal Committee (Mingyuan Weiyuanhui) and the Mutual Aid As-
sociation of the Bereaved Families (Yizu Huzhuhui).
In Kuala Lumpur, the Joint Appeal Preparation Committee was established
on July 3, 1946 to demand trials for those responsible for the big roundup
incident of March 6, 1942 in which 1,000 Chinese were put to death there.
Groups represented at the inaugural meeting included the Chinese Chamber
of Commerce (Zhonghua Zongshanghui), the MPAJA (Malayan People’s Anti-
Japanese Army) Ex-Service Comrades Association (Renmin Kangrijun Tuiwu
Tongzhi Hui), the China Democratic League (CDL) (Zhongguo Minzhu
Tongmeng) (its representative was Kon Voon Sem [Guan Wen Sen]), the
Kuomintang’s Selangor branch, and the Pan-Malayan General Labour Union
(PMGLU). Also among those present was the Chinese consul in Kuala Lumpur,
Hsu Meng Hsiung (Xu Meng Xiong),6 who made a speech.
In Singapore, the Japanese army officers who were primarily responsible
for the general roundup were sentenced on April 2, 1947 at the tribunal held
there. However, the sentences were far more lenient than expected by the
bereaved families. The editorial in the April 3 edition of the Nan Chiau Jit
Pao expressed the strong dissatisfaction felt by the bereaved families in the
following terms.
We should work through the Joint Appeal Committee to seek a re-trial. If that is
not possible, we should ask the Chinese government to use diplomatic means to
bring about a new trial. The victims were overseas Chinese, and the Chinese gov-
ernment surely cannot allow the wrongs suffered by them to go unpunished.
The Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families
(Xingzhou Beijianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui) held a rally on April 6 and
resolved to ask the Chinese Foreign Ministry to negotiate with the Japanese
government regarding the payment of compensation to victims. They also
called on the Chinese Foreign Ministry to open negotiations with the British
government regarding a new trial for those responsible for the massacre. A
letter requesting the fulfillment of their demands was handed to Consul Gen-
eral Wu Paak Shing.7 In the same month, Consul General Wu responded to
the wishes of the bereaved families by sending a letter to the governor of
Singapore, Franklin Gimson, demanding the death penalty for those respon-
sible.8 However, no new trial was ever held.
In May 1947, the consul general, with the support of many Chinese, asked
the British colonial government to seek the return of compulsory “donations”
amounting to 50 million Straits dollars that the Japanese military had levied
from overseas Chinese.9 This request was also rejected by the British authori-
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ties. These facts are reflections of China’s situation at this time and its limited
influence in international affairs. The consulates thus lacked the power to
protect the rights of overseas Chinese in these areas.
In March 1948, the United Kingdom and China agreed to work toward
returning to their original owners of assets seized by Japan in British territo-
ries (Nan Chiau Jit Pao, March 29, 1948). Unfortunately, this agreement had
little effect and was simply filed away.
III. Relief for Suffering Overseas Chinese
The political and economic upheavals that affected postwar Malaya were
reflected in frequent labor disputes, especially at rubber plantations and tin
mines. There was also increasing political conflict driven by pressure for de-
mocratization and self-rule. After the Malayan Communist Party initiated its
armed struggle in 1948, most of the Chinese living in outlying areas were
forcibly relocated by the British authorities. They were suspected of supply-
ing food and new recruits to the guerrillas and providing support, including
bases and refuges, to the MCP. Most of the Chinese in outlying areas were
people who had fled inland to escape the calamities of the Japanese occupa-
tion. In the early 1950s, this forced relocation program moved into high gear,
and ultimately between 500,000 and 600,000 people were shifted.
In addition to oppression by the British authorities as a result of frequent
disputes, conflicts, and confrontations, the overseas Chinese were also de-
prived of their economic base, including jobs and housing, due to a campaign
by Malays, the majority ethnic group, to drive them out. They were called the
nanqiao, or “suffering overseas Chinese.”
1. Relief Measures for People Forcibly Relocated during the Japanese
Occupation
The consuls began to provide assistance to the nanqiao in 1947. The Min
Sheng Pao reported the following case. The Japanese military had forced
about one hundred households consisting of over two thousand people to
settle in Badong New Village in Kuala Selangor (Selangor State). In Febru-
ary 1947 these people were again forcibly relocated, this time by the British
authorities. The reasons are not clear, but it appears that Malays had sought
the return of the land, which was originally a Malay reservation. The Chinese
inhabitants asked the Chinese consul in Kuala Lumpur, Hsu Meng Hsiung, to
approach the British authorities in order to seek the cancellation of the evacu-
ation order.10 On May 22 he met with the Sultan and asked his help in having
the order rescinded. The consul also worked to restore relations between lo-
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cal Malays and the Chinese residents, and on May 27 the communities held a
friendship meeting.11 However, it is not known if the evacuation order was
ever rescinded, since there are no records.
According to the Nan Chiau Jit Pao, a community of just over five hun-
dred Chinese residents in New South Sea Village (Xin Nanyang Cun) on the
outskirts of Sungai Way (Selangor) sought the assistance of the consul gen-
eral in Singapore, Wu Paak Shing, in October 1947. The population of the
village (all Chinese) were originally residents of the Ampang 6 and 7 sections
on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur. They were relocated by the Japanese mili-
tary in March 1943 on the grounds that they had links with anti-Japanese
guerrillas. Unable to establish an adequate agricultural base, the people were
living under considerable hardship.12
In late June 1947, the Chinese consul in Penang, Li Neng Geng, promised
Chinese farmers in Penang and Province Wellesley, who had been resettled
on barren land after repeated forced relocations, that the Chinese government’s
Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission would provide financial aid totaling
U.S.$60,000. However, the money failed to materialize, and in late July, the
Province Wellesley Farmers’ Union, an MCP-affiliated organization consist-
ing of 5,274 people in 979 households, sent a letter to the consulate seeking
immediate payment. The aid was never sent.13
In June 1948, Chinese farmers who had been resettled at Kulim in Kedah
State during the Japanese occupation were ordered to leave the area by the
British colonial authorities. According to a media report, they asked the act-
ing consul to intercede on their behalf.14
The Chinese government’s aid programs for overseas Chinese were not
limited to farmers. On May 7, 1946, for example, Consul General Wu Paak
Shing was quoted in the Straits Times as saying that the Chinese government
would provide aid totaling 30 million Straits dollars for the restoration of
overseas Chinese industries in Malaya. However, this was not forthcoming.
2. Relief Efforts Following Clashes with the Malay Population
On March 6, 1946 a clash between Malays and the Chinese at the village of
Bekor in Perak State left fifty-six Malays dead. Eighteen Chinese were charged
with responsibility for the incident. In June 1947, nine of these people were
found not guilty and released, but the other nine were sentenced to death.
Many Chinese associations expressed outrage that the British authorities had
chosen to put the entire blame for the incident on the Chinese community,
and the Chinese consuls in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and Penang were asked
to assist the defendants. On July 23, 1947 the three consuls met in Kuala
Lumpur to consider their response. They then issued a call for reconciliation
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between the Malay and Chinese communities. The consul general in Singapore,
Wu Paak Shing, met with the governor of the Malayan Union, Edward Gent,
and asked for clemency. Kuang Da, who had succeeded Hsu Meng Hsiung as
consul in Kuala Lumpur that May, had observed the trial and also met with
the governor. As a result of this campaign, the death sentences imposed on
the nine defendants were commuted on August 13 and replaced with jail terms
of between five and fifteen years.15
The consulates were keen on monitoring the legal actions, not only the
imposition of death sentences but also the overall pattern of arrests, imposed
on the Chinese. The Anglo-Chinese Treaty of January 11, 1943 required the
British authorities to notify a Chinese consulate immediately in the event that
any overseas Chinese was arrested, detained, or deported, but it seems this
requirement had been left unattended. According to newspaper reports, the
Chinese consul in Penang, Li Neng Geng, demanded notification in March
and May of 1947.16 The British authorities accepted the consul’s demands
and began to provide notification from November 17, 1947.17
Yet this was not merely a matter of the Chinese government exercising
sovereignty over overseas Chinese. Complex domestic political issues in China
were also involved. For overseas Chinese affiliated to the Chinese Commu-
nist Party, which opposed the Kuomintang government in power, notification
was something to be avoided, since it could result in their being handed over
to the Kuomintang regime with the prospect of extremely harsh treatment.
In its editorial of November 29, 1947, the Nan Chiau Jit Pao, which was
sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party, was critical of this situation,
saying that in a sovereign state, crimes by foreign residents should be subject
to trial by the authorities of that nation. It condemned the notification require-
ment as mechanism used by the Kuomintang to threaten overseas Chinese.
(Yet this position is self-contradictory because those who were affiliated to
the Chinese Communist Party had firmly held that the British authorities should
not restrict the political activities of overseas Chinese unless they became
involved in local politics.) The Min Sheng Pao (the organ of the Malayan
Communist Party) also criticized the notification system in its editorial of
November 24, describing it as a pretext for driving out the Chinese. Lee Kong
Chian (Li Guang Qian), chairman of the Associated Malayan Chinese Cham-
bers of Commerce (formed in February 1947 through the merger of all Chi-
nese Chambers of Commerce in Malaya), stated that while such an arrange-
ment might be acceptable in a country with few overseas Chinese, it was
unacceptable in a country with a large Chinese community, such as Malaya.
He said the consulates should first of all consult with the overseas Chinese
community. This view was echoed by Secretary-General Eu Chooi Yip (Yu
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Zhu Ye) of the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU), a moderate left-wing
political party that was part of a united front with the Malayan Communist
Party. In addition to his concern about the risk that Chinese would be ex-
cluded from Malaya, Eu also stated that the Kuomintang government in
Nanjing did not know the circumstances of overseas Chinese in Malaya.18
The above criticisms reflected on the one hand the views of people sympa-
thetic to the Chinese Communist Party and on the other the thinking of people
whose lives were beginning to be rooted in Malaya. Analyzing more
specifically some of the factors that characterized the Chinese community in
this period, the overseas Chinese community was divided into supporters of
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party and was thus unable to
take united action to protect Chinese rights. As a result, it lacked the influence
to force the British authorities to accept Chinese demands. In addition, anti-
Kuomintang groups were not united in support for the Chinese Communist
Party or democratization in China. In fact, there were already people whose
first aim was to secure rights in Malaya.
Apart from China’s lack of influence in the international community, the
limited effectiveness of the consulates in protecting the overseas Chinese was
also due to internal conflicts within the Chinese community itself. The pro-
communist faction opposed any involvement of (the Kuomintang
government’s) consulates in political activities by overseas Chinese but wanted
the consulates to protect the overseas Chinese from oppressive policies im-
posed by the colonial authorities in Malaya. The consulates were probably
confused somewhat by their dual stances.
The determination of the Chinese government to prevent clashes between
Malays and overseas Chinese was apparent from the type of person it chose
to head the new consulate that it established in Ipoh in August 1948. The new
consul, Haji Ibrahim T. Y. Ma (Ma Tian Ying), was a Muslim and had been
director of the Chinese Islamic Association. In 1938 he had visited Malaya as
a leader of the China Muslim Goodwill Mission to Southeast Asia. After tak-
ing office, Ma undertook frequent trips to mediate clashes between the Malays
and Chinese and called for the restoration of good relations between the two
communities. When his consulate was closed after Britain severed relations
with the Kuomintang government in January 1950, Ma resigned from the
government service and remained in Malaya to pursue a career in commerce.
He continued to call for unity between the Malays and Chinese.
The consulates worked to prevent Malay-Chinese conflicts and protect the
Chinese on a number of occasions. On April 21, 1947 a clash between the two
communities at Jugra in Selangor left one Chinese dead, one wounded, and
one missing. Consul Hsu Meng Hsiung took steps to protect the Chinese com-
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munity while appealing for calm on both sides.19
On April 28, 1947 a police squad opened fire on Chinese workers at the
Dublin Estate, an American-owned rubber plantation in the Kulim District of
Kedah. One person was killed and five wounded. After inspecting the scene
on May 4, the consul in Penang, Li Neng Gong, demanded that the British
authorities should punish those responsible and pay compensation. In mid-
May, three thousand rubber plantation workers went on strike against what
they saw as British oppression. The British authorities put the police officers
involved in the incident on trial. However, despite calls from Chinese groups
in various places and Consul Li for severe penalties to be imposed, the sen-
tences were light.20
At the end of December 1948, the disappearance of two Malays at Beruas
in Dindings District of Perak sparked a clash that left five Chinese dead and
nine missing. As a result of this incident, a thousand Chinese residents fled
the area. Representatives of these people sought assistance from Haji Ibrahim
T. Y. Ma, the Chinese consul in Ipoh. In mid-January 1949, Ma visited the
scene of the clash to investigate the circumstances of the incident and tried to
calm the tension. The Sultan of Perak also became involved in mediation
efforts, and by the end of January 1949 the situation had been resolved.21
According to a report in July 1949, a Chinese village on the outskirts of
Kampar in Perak was attacked by the Sakais, a native ethnic group, causing
forty-eight people to flee the area. Consul Ma was again asked to help.22
3. Protecting the Rights of Petty Traders and Hawkers
Another focus of the consulates’ efforts to help economically underprivi-
leged people was the protection of the rights of petty traders and hawkers.
Many overseas Chinese worked as hawkers, an occupation that was seen as
the starting point for a career in commerce. Some became traders after travel-
ing to Malaya from China and working on rubber plantations or in other oc-
cupations, while others took to trading immediately after their arrival in
Malaya. Petty trading yielded a small and very uncertain income, and it was
difficult to secure licenses and business areas. Hawkers faced severe restric-
tion by local governments and were frequently driven out of areas. For this
reason, hawkers often asked the consulates to approach local governments on
their behalf over such matters as the extension of trading licenses. This type
of problem occurred in Seremban in 1946, in Singapore and Kuala Pilah (Ne-
gri Sembilan) in 1947, and again in Singapore in 1948. In August 1947 the
Chinese consul in Kuala Lumpur, Kuang Da, attended the first anniversary
meeting of the Kuala Lumpur Hawkers’ Association and made a speech.23
However, the Nan Chiau Jit Pao (August 5, 1947) was critical of Kuang’s
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activities in Kuala Pilah, expressing disappointment at his ineffectiveness in
negotiations with the authorities. Although the consuls were a focus of hope
for the petty traders and hawkers, it seems that they were often unable to
fulfill those expectations.
4. Aiding Chinese Farmers during the Emergency
After the Malayan Communist Party launched its armed struggle in June
1948, the British authorities mobilized troops and police in an effort to elimi-
nate communist supporters. The State of Emergency was declared nation-
wide on June 18. Rural Chinese communities were seen as a support base for
the Malayan Communist Party, so Chinese villages were burned and their
residents forcibly relocated. This forced resettlement program began in ear-
nest with the adoption of the Briggs Plan in 1950, but the prototype of the
scheme was already being implemented as early as the closing months of
1948. In October and November of that year, the entire village of Kachau in
Selangor, which had several hundred residents in over seventy households,
was burned.24 The villages of Jalong and Lintang on the outskirts of Sungai
Siput in Perak, which had a total of five hundred households, were also burned,
and approximately two to three thousand people, including children, were
forcibly relocated.25 The Chinese residents of Shanding Village (Malay name
unknown) in Muar District of Johor State were forcibly resettled under a clear-
ance program.26
In December 1948 twenty-four Chinese workers were shot dead on a Brit-
ish-owned rubber plantation in the village of Batang Kali on the outskirts of
Kuala Kubu Baru in Selangor.27 In 1949 Chinese residents were forcibly re-
located from a number of places, including Hylam Kang in Senai District
of Johor,28 Changkat Jong in Perak, and the Sungkai hunting area also in
Perak.29
Among the organizations that provided assistance to the Chinese victims
(nanqiao) of this program of village-burning and forced resettlement were
Chinese Chambers of Commerce (Zhonghua Zongshanghui) in various parts
of Malaya, Chinese Assembly Halls (Zhonghua Dahuitang) which were over-
seas Chinese organizations at state level, Chinese Associations (Zhonghua
Gonghui) which were overseas Chinese organizations at municipal level, and
clan associations (Hui Guan) which were state-level as well as regional asso-
ciations of overseas Chinese who belong to the same clan. These groups also
went to the consulates with representatives of the victims in order to seek
assistance from the consuls.
As early as August 3, 1948 the consulate general in Kuala Lumpur re-
ported that it was investigating casualties and damages among Chinese under
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the Emergency (Nan Chiau Jit Pao, August 5, 1948). In Ipoh, Consul Ma
convened a rally of overseas Chinese organizations on November 17 and 22,
1948 to discuss relief measures for the thousands of Chinese refugees within
his consulate’s jurisdiction. Groups participating in this meeting included the
General Federation of Trade Associations in Perak (Pili Hangtuan Lianhe
Zonghui), the Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Perak Chinese As-
sembly Hall, and the Kuomintang’s Malayan branch.
The Kuomintang’s involvement in efforts to aid pro-communist elements
may seem surprising. However, it is indicative of a number of factors, includ-
ing the party’s judgment that the number of pro-communist people and com-
munist sympathizers was not large and that the party would risk alienating
the masses of the Chinese in Malaya if the party ignored the sense of crisis
keenly felt by Malayan Chinese in general as well as the existence of ex-
tremely strong sympathy for the sufferings of fellow Chinese.
The consulates found themselves in a delicate position. As representatives
of the Chinese government, they had to strive to protect overseas Chinese,
but as representatives of the Kuomintang government it was preferable for
them to suppress pro-communist elements. For this reason, most of the con-
suls were reluctant to become involved in efforts to alleviate the sufferings of
Chinese refugees.
Haji Ibrahim T. Y. Ma, the Chinese consul in Ipoh, played the most active
role in relief efforts for overseas Chinese after the declaration of the Emer-
gency. On December 3, 1948 he visited Teluk Anson (present-day Teluk Intan)
in Perak to express sympathy to Chinese refugees who had fled to that town,
and he appealed to them saying, “The 2.5 million Chinese throughout Malaya
must unite. I urge you to participate actively in the Chinese Union (Huaqiao
Lianhe) which is now being established by volunteers in Singapore and Ma-
lacca.”30 (The Chinese Union denotes the Malayan Chinese League [Malaiya
Huaren Lianmeng] proposed by Tan Cheng Lock [Chen Zhen Lu] in Novem-
ber 1947.) The consul appears to have recognized that his ability to provide
assistance would be limited.
The consul general in Kuala Lumpur, Li Qing, said that he would not criti-
cize the Kachau Incident if it was carried out to root out “bandits,” by which
he apparently meant Malayan Communist Party guerrillas. However, he stated
that more time should have been provided to enable people to prepare for
resettlement. At the same time, at the request of the Selangor Chinese Assem-
bly Hall and other groups, he sent a consul on a fact-finding visit to the area
and asked the British authorities to investigate the situation and pay compen-
sation.31 However, it appears that no compensation was paid.
In December 1948 Consul General Li entered into negotiations with the
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British authorities over compensation and other matters pertaining to the
Batang Kali Incident, and about the accidental bombing of the village of Salak
South by the British air force in August 1948 which left three Chinese dead
and nine wounded. Eventually compensation amounting to 4,300 Straits dol-
lars was paid.32 In January 1949 Li made a speech in which he summed up
the activities of the consulates and the consulates general since the declara-
tion of the Malaya-wide Emergency in June 1948 and outlined their future
policy. He said that it was difficult to distinguish bandits and their supporters
from law-abiding citizens. He then urged Chinese farmers in Malaya to coop-
erate with the government (the British colonial authorities), and called upon
all Chinese in Malaya to provide aid to farmers who had been resettled.33 Li
advised farmers to leave areas designated for evacuation,34 and urged the
British authorities to release the innocent without delay.35
In February 1948 the consulate general in Kuala Lumpur issued a warning
that failure to cooperate with the British military and police or report infor-
mation about communist elements to the Malayan (i.e., British) authorities
could result in deportation.36
The consul in Malacca, Cheng Jia Hua, received an appeal for assistance
following the Hylam Kang Incident. After consulting with the consul general
in Singapore, Wu Paak Shing, in January 1949, he traveled to Batu Pahat in
Johor and was welcomed at a reception attended by representatives of thirty-
nine overseas Chinese organizations. In his speech he urged these people to
cooperate in the efforts of the Malayan government (i.e., the British colonial
authorities) to put down the uprising. He also urged the Chinese to move
from areas affected by disturbances without delay, and to build friendly rela-
tions with the Malay people.37
In February 1949 the local Chinese Association in Muar (Johor) responded
to Consul Cheng’s recommendations by calling a meeting for representatives
of Chinese organizations. Six people were chosen to represent these groups at
a convention to form the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) (Malaiya
Huaren Gonghui).38 Based on a concept put forward by Tan Cheng Lock, the
MCA was the first ethnic Chinese party in Malaya to participate in Malayan
politics. The convention was held on February 27, 1949.
As the insurgent activities of the MCP intensified, the Chinese consuls, Li
Qing and Cheng Jia Hua, were forced to make their positions clear and finally
demonstrated that their first priority was to oppose communism. Abandoning
their avowed policy of protecting all Chinese, they not only cooperated will-
ingly with the colonial authorities in efforts to suppress communist elements,
but even urged the overseas Chinese in Malaya to cooperate in the suppres-
sion of communist activities. In the author’s view, this stance may have had
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the effect of causing the majority of overseas Chinese, especially those in-
volved in farming, to shift their attitudes away from China.
The consul who showed the greatest dedication to the cause of alleviating
the sufferings of overseas Chinese during this period was Consul Ma. Yet
even he, like Consul Cheng, saw that the overseas Chinese would ultimately
need to unite and form their own organization (i.e., political party). The con-
suls sought to bring about a shift in attitude among overseas Chinese, and to
end their reliance on the Chinese government. In retrospect it is clear that
their stance was an extremely wise one. As demonstrated by the events in
Muar, their advice actually contributed indirectly to the formation and growth
of the Malayan Chinese Association. At the time, however, the attitude of the
consuls was seen as an indication that the Chinese government was turning
its back on the many overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese organizations
that had sought its protection. The disappointment felt by many overseas
Chinese seems to have strengthened their identification with Malaya.
Between March 1949 and the closure of the consulates general and all of
the consulates in January 1950, there were almost no articles in the Nan Chiau
Jit Pao about the efforts of the consuls and consuls general to relieve the
sufferings of overseas Chinese. In fact, the main source of assistance from
this period onwards was the new political party, the Malayan Chinese Asso-
ciation.39 There can be no doubt that the activities of the MCA in this area
encouraged Chinese farmers and the Chinese community as a whole to iden-
tify more closely with Malaya.
In addition to the role of the consulates, we also need to examine the rela-
tionship between China and the nanqiao after the establishment of the People’s
Republic in October 1949. This will be analyzed in more detail later. First,
there is another aspect of the Emergency that should be considered.
Not all Chinese farmers saw their homes burned and were forced to leave
their communities and settle in the “new villages.” Tens of thousands were
deported to China after being categorized as supporters of the Malayan Com-
munist Party. Most of these people had lived for decades or generations in
Malaya. Not only did they have no economic ties with China, but many did
not even have relatives there. According to British reports on the 1950–51
period, despair drove some of these people to commit suicide by leaping into
the sea from the vessels on which they were being deported.40
The deportation program was suspended after the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China but was resumed in November 1950. It was again
halted on January 25, 1951 due to China’s refusal to accept any more deportees,
but deportations resumed on March 20.
The Chinese government did everything possible to provide livelihoods
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and work for the returnees. In November and December of 1950, returned
overseas Chinese, democratic parties, and the General People’s Association
of Relief (Renmin Jiuji Zonghui) held rallies throughout China to protest the
oppression of their “fellow Chinese” by the British authorities. On December
29 a China’s foreign ministry spokesman issued a statement criticizing the
oppression of “China’s overseas nationals.”41
In March 1951 the Chinese government established the Chinese People’s
Relief Committee for the Overseas Chinese Refugees of Malaya (Zhongguo
Renmin Jiuji Malaiya Nan Qiao Weiyuanhui). This committee consisted of
twenty-nine people, including several Malayan Chinese, such as Tan Kah
Kee (Chen Jia Geng), Hu Yu Zhi, and Cheong Choo Kun (Zhang Chu Kun). It
asked the British government to allow a survey team to visit Malaya in order
to investigate the tragic situation of overseas Chinese there. The seventeen-
member survey team included a number of overseas Chinese who had been
returned to China from Malaya. Cheong Choo Kun was one of the three deputy
leaders of the mission, and five of the other thirteen members were also former
Malayan Chinese. These were Wu Feng, who had been a member of the edu-
cation committee of the Federation of Malaya, as well as Hu Yi Sheng, Huang
Lu Ping, Zhang Zhuang Fei, and Lu Xin Yuan. However, 203 Kuomintang-
affiliated organizations in Singapore urged the British authorities to reject the
mission, and the application was refused.42 The British attitude toward China
at this time was manifested in the words of Henry Gurney, the High Commis-
sioner for the Federation of Malaya: “If they feel that Chinese detainees in
Malaya are not getting fair treatment they can solve the problem by opening
their ports and allowing them to enter China.”43
Between August 1950 and mid-1951, the British authorities considered a
number of options for the five thousand communist detainees and their de-
pendents who numbered ten thousand. These included dumping the people
on China’s coast, resettling them on an island off Borneo’s north coast (the
island of Balambangan was selected after surveys), and deportation to the
Solomon Islands, the Seychelles, or East Africa.
The first option was suggested in November 1950 by Harold Briggs, who
had devised the New Village scheme. However, it was abandoned in June
1951 for military reasons (the unavailability of naval vessels which were be-
ing used for other duties). There was also technical problems, since it would
have been necessary to move the entire group in one operation, which meant
that it would not have been possible to complete the process quickly enough
to avoid detection by the Chinese authorities. From the foreign policy per-
spective, it was feared that the scheme would cause a worsening of relations
with China and could jeopardize the safety of British nationals in China. The
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second option was rejected in July 1951. Reasons included the difficulty of
policing the settlement, a lack of arable land, and opposition from native chiefs
and the governor of the Crown Colony of North Borneo. The British were
also forced to abandon the third option due to opposition from colonial au-
thorities in the target regions.44
Britain had long criticized China for interference in matters pertaining to
British colonial subjects. It was clearly inconsistent for the British to attempt
to push the responsibility for the Malayan Emergency onto China by sending
back overseas Chinese. For China, which had only just emerged from a civil
war, the acceptance of tens of thousands of overseas Chinese would have
been a heavy financial burden. Although the new China constantly called for
protection of overseas Chinese, it had no substantial economic or social links
with overseas Chinese communities, and in some ways it was as if it was
being forced to strengthen a relationship that suddenly appeared from no-
where. For their part, the overseas Chinese felt that Britain was forcing them
to view China as their protector.
This situation demonstrates the harsh attitude of the British colonial gov-
ernment toward overseas Chinese. It also illustrates the foolishness of the
forced expulsion policy which served only to worsen the situation. Instead of
this policy the colonial government should have taken the responsible mea-
sures to encourage overseas Chinese to identify more closely with Malaya.
IV. Resident Registration
The consulates and the consulates general also provided resident registration
services for overseas Chinese and issued them with registration certificates.
The Min Sheng Pao, the organ of the Malayan Communist Party, criticized
these services which began on November 1, 1947, arguing in its November 6,
1947 issue that they represented “a new means of earning funds.” It again
wrote in its November 11, 1947 issue that progressive overseas Chinese would
not register because they would be able to retain their Chinese citizenship
even if they did not register, and it added that (the registration is redundant
because) even if they registered they would not lose their Malayan citizen-
ship. It also emphasized that the status of overseas Chinese depended on the
strength and prosperity of their motherland and their own enthusiasm for par-
ticipation in Malayan politics. This criticism suggests that the leftist Chinese’s
attitude toward the consulates was again inconsistent as was observed with
the issue of notification when overseas Chinese were arrested. Their mixed
attitude toward the consulates’ policy for strengthening protection over the
Chinese in turn seems to have thwarted the efforts of the consulates.
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Initially registrations at the consulates general in Singapore and Kuala
Lumpur were scheduled from November 1, 1947 to October 31, 1948. How-
ever, the number of registrations during this period fell short of expectations,
and the period was extended to the end of 1948 in Kuala Lumpur, and to April
30, 1949 in Singapore.
In Singapore the actual business of registration was undertaken by more
than eighty overseas Chinese organizations, including the Johor State Chi-
nese Association, the Batu Pahat Chinese Association (in Johor), and the
Kuomintang-affiliated Singapore San Min Zu Yi Youth Corps.45 Registra-
tions were also conducted in early 1949 by the consulate in Malacca, which
had been established in August 1948.46 The final number of registrations is
unavailable, but it was significant that the consulates and consulates general
in those days had the role of registering the entire overseas Chinese popula-
tion.
From the standpoint of the consulates, registration must have been a neces-
sary prerequisite for the protection of overseas Chinese. On the other hand,
the opposition of leftists seems to have been directed not so much at the inter-
vention of the Chinese government in Malayan internal affairs, as at the op-
pression of Chinese communist elements by the Kuomintang government.
The consulates’ role in registration itself had long been accepted by both the
British colonial government in Malaya and the entire overseas Chinese com-
munity. Therefore, it is not clear how far Chinese attitudes turned against
registration at that time. What is more important in this issue is the fact that
the consulates clearly played a role in registration in that period, in contrast
with the situation today.
The consulates and consulates general in Malaya were viewed with high
expectations by broad sectors of the overseas Chinese community which saw
them as a source of protection from a war-devastated economy and the disor-
ders of the nationwide Emergency. In many cases, however, their expecta-
tions were betrayed.
Hsu Meng Hsiung, consul in Kuala Lumpur, played the most active role in
efforts to protect Chinese and was the most trusted of the postwar consuls and
consuls general among the Chinese community. Consul Hsu also busied him-
self in rescuing many evacuated Chinese who had fled to Kelang in Selangor
from the confusion caused by the rise of the independence movement and
anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia. (Other consuls also worked to rescue
Chinese refugees from Indonesia.) His activities included the demobiliza-
tion, through persuasion, of members of the Kuomintang-affiliated Overseas
Chinese Anti-Japanese Army which had engaged in continued guerrilla war-
fare in mountainous areas after the Japanese army surrendered and become a
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serious problem for the British army.47 He also negotiated with the British
authorities to obtain business licenses for petty traders and hawkers,48 and
worked to bring about a reconciliation between the rightist and leftist ele-
ments of the Chinese community. In addition, he attended a meeting of the
Selangor sub-branch of the China Democratic League, a leftist party which
was sympathetic with the Chinese Communist Party, in an effort to promote
unification of all overseas Chinese.
However, Consul Hsu’s conciliatory stance toward leftists seems to have
displeased the Kuomintang government, while his enthusiastic protection of
Chinese was regarded by the British authorities as an act of arrogation and
interference in internal affairs. Presumably for these reasons, the Kuomintang
government suddenly decided in April 1947 to transfer Hsu to the embassy of
India. When his transfer was reported, Chinese organizations in Kuala Lumpur,
Seremban, and other cities cabled the Foreign Ministry in Nanjing requesting
that Consul Hsu stay in his current post. When he was transferred in spite of
those requests, the Chinese communities held farewell parties for him, as
described in the previous chapter.
A month or so after Hsu Meng Hsiung left Malaya, the Min Sheng Pao, the
organ of the Malayan Communist Party, ridiculed the new consul, Kuang Da,
and the Kuomintang government, saying that the new consul preferred to
attend only such occasions as wedding ceremonies and receptions to wel-
come or bid farewell to people, while praising Hsu’s efforts to unify the Chi-
nese community (July 16, 1947).
These developments concerning Consul Hsu indicate that however serious
and enthusiastic he might have been in his efforts to protect overseas Chi-
nese, his ability to respond to requests from the Chinese community was lim-
ited by the international circumstances of the time, as well as by a lack of
unity and rights among the Chinese themselves. The consul’s personal quali-
ties could not offset the powerlessness of his consulate.
Lee Kong Chian, chairman of the Associated Malayan Chinese Chambers
of Commerce and chairman of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce,
remarked in July 1947 that the Chinese Chambers of Commerce were power-
less, and that the consulate was responsible for protecting Chinese.49 The fact
was that the consulate itself was unable to provide effective protection for the
overseas Chinese people. This powerlessness, which was the unavoidable
result of prevailing circumstances, affected the attitudes of overseas Chinese,
who became estranged from China and were thus motivated to remain and
settle in Malaya.
THE ROLE OF THE CONSULATES 69
V. The Role of the MCA
As stated earlier, the consulates’ role of rescuing evacuated Chinese, which
was the biggest problem facing Malayan Chinese between the late 1940s and
early 1950s, was taken over by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).
While the consulates ultimately failed to meet the expectations of many over-
seas Chinese and their associations, the MCA, which was established on Feb-
ruary 27, 1949, enjoyed considerable success in its rescue operations which
were financed in part with revenues from lottery sales.
The MCA’s established profile today is different from the way in which it
was represented in the Nan Chiau Jit Pao and the Min Sheng Pao. We will
comment briefly on this difference.
According to the MCA’s own written history, Tan Cheng Lock announced
the concept of the association’s prototype, the Malayan Chinese League, in
September 1948.50 Another book on the history of the MCA, written by Heng
Pek Koon, says that the organization was proposed in May 1948.51 However,
the Nan Chiau Jit Pao and the Min Sheng Pao both reported that Tan pro-
posed the establishment of the Malayan Chinese League as early as Novem-
ber 25, 1947.52 At that time, Tan was opposed, together with Malay and Chi-
nese leftists, to the plan to establish the Federation of Malaya. He was re-
garded as the unchallenged leader of the nationwide unified front, Putera-
AMCJA. (“Putera” stands for “Pusat Tenaga Rakyat” [the Centre of People’s
Power], a Malay leftist group, and AMCJA for the All-Malayan Council of
Joint Action, a group led by Chinese moderate leftists.) Tan won the support
of the Malayan communists during this period.
Until April 5, 1948 the Min Sheng Pao, the de facto organ of the MCP,
frequently carried highly favorable reports about Tan’s concept of the Chi-
nese League. However, the newspaper suddenly reversed its position in its
edition of April 11 which criticized Tan as “a mouthpiece for the benefits of
the bourgeoisie.” This reversal appears to have foretold a change in the MCP’s
policy toward its armed struggle which was openly declared in June 1948. Or
it can be assumed that the MCP had already started the process of changing
its policy around this period.
The established theory today is that the Malayan Chinese Association was
organized entirely by rightists from the outset. The evidence put forward to
support this conclusion includes the fact that Tan himself was a wealthy busi-
nessman, and the fact that the formation of the MCA was supported by the
British government and the Kuomintang government. (For instance, Cheng
Jia Hua, the consul in Malacca, was involved in the formation of the Muar
MCA, as explained earlier, while Consul Ma in Ipoh helped to establish the
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Perak State MCA.)53 Also cited is the fact that MCA leaders included many
Kuomintang leaders. However, it appears that this theory does not reflect the
real situation of the time. The positive view of the MCA held by the Malayan
Communist Party up until April 1948 must have been shared by a broad range
of overseas Chinese, especially Chinese farmers, who formed the support
base of the Malayan communists. Some of these people must have found the
abrupt censure of Tan by the MCP unacceptable, with the result that they
became estranged from the MCP and began to support Tan and the MCA. For
instance, Lim Lian Geok (Lin Lian Yu), who was reinstated as chairman of
the school administration committee of Confucian Secondary School in Kuala
Lumpur immediately after World War II, resisted the Kuomintang
government’s intervention in education and often sided, as a member of the
school’s alumni, with Chow Yam Peng (Zhou Yang Bin), the alumni chair-
man and an influential member of the MCP Selangor State Committee.54 Af-
ter the MCA was formed, however, Lim became one of the leading figures of
its Malacca branch.55
Less than two weeks after the formation of the MCA in February 1949, an
editorial in the Xian Dai Ri Bao, which was virtually an organ of the Penang
sub-branch of the China Democratic League (CDL), a leftist party of main-
land China that sympathized with the Chinese Communist Party, predicted
that the MCA would succeed in uniting Malaya-born Chinese with other over-
seas Chinese. The editorial continued, “Since the member organizations of
the MCA did not hold general meetings of their members to ratify their deci-
sion to join the MCA, their legitimacy is still a little doubtful, and it will be
necessary to follow its future course to see whether its name will agree with
its nature.” The editorial concluded with a eulogy that if unity among Chi-
nese as well as ethnic cooperation between the Chinese and Malays had been
realized two years earlier, the tragedy of the Emergency would surely have
been avoided. Thus it expressed generally favorable comments, though with
some reservations, on the MCA and concluded that they hoped that the MCA
would succeed, and that the sufferings of overseas Chinese would be eased.56
Other evidence of the complex situation concerning the support basis of
the MCA is the Selangor Chinese Women’s Li Chi Association, an MCP-
affiliated organization, which joined the MCA’s Selangor branch.57 This was
not an exceptional case. As was mentioned before and will be discussed in
detail later, many regional Chinese Associations (Zhonghua Gonghui), which
would be core elements in the formation of the MCA, had been associated
with the CCP and the MCP.
Some among the British authorities took the view that Tan Cheng Lock
was being manipulated by Malayan communists.58 After the MCA was orga-
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nized, J. J. Paskin, Secretary of State for the Colonies, received a letter dated
March 1, 1949 from Henry Gurney, the High Commissioner for the Federa-
tion of Malaya, to the effect that he welcomed the formation of the MCA as
an organization that would cooperate with Britain and abide by its laws. Paskin
wrote back on March 8 saying that he was a little surprised to see Tan, who
had led leftist activities, being elected the MCA president.59
In her book, Heng Pek Koon states, “The CWC [Central Working Commit-
tee] members [of the MCA] held major positions in almost every type of
Chinese association.”60 She also notes that the MCA was launched with the
cooperation of leaders from the most important Chinese associations in the
country, and that Chinese association leaders were the founders and promot-
ers of the MCA.61
However, this description overemphasizes the personal role played by the
leaders of Chinese organizations in setting up the MCA and fails to explain
properly the MCA’s relationship with those organizations. Contrary to Heng’s
view, the author regards the role played by various Chinese organizations per
se as more important, and this stance is endorsed by many press reports. For
instance, the Nan Chiau Jit Pao reported that Tan Cheng Lock and Lee Hau
Sik (Li Xiao Shi) reached a final agreement on the formation of the MCA on
February 1, 1949, and that they decided to request the presence of two leaders
each from local Chinese organizations at the MCA Foundation Convention
on February 27.62
In Selangor, representatives of fifty-nine Chinese organizations met a week
before the convention and selected fifty-five preparatory committee members
with Lee Hau Sik appointed as chairman.63 As noted earlier, the Chinese As-
sociation of Batu Pahat in Johor selected four representatives for the conven-
tion. The Kwangtung Association of Malacca also selected four representa-
tives on February 23.64
Incidentally, the Nan Chiau Jit Pao noted in its report on the MCA Foun-
dation Convention that the convention elected Tan Cheng Lock as president
and decided to appoint the chairmen of the Chinese Associations of ten states
as MCA vice-presidents.65 This report is, however, erroneous. It was the chair-
men of the MCA branches of ten states that became vice-presidents. Yet this
report reflects the prevailing perception that the MCA was established upon
the foundation of the existing Chinese organizations. Indeed, the February 28
issue of the Sin Chew Jit Poh reported on the first day of the convention under
the headline, “Representatives of All the Malayan Chinese Organizations Meet
in Kuala Lumpur” (italics added).66
In March, the Chinese Association of Batu Pahat convened a meeting of
the representatives of Chinese organizations, and decided to establish an MCA
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sub-branch composed of representatives of the Chinese Association, Chinese
Chamber of Commerce, and various clan associations. The Keluang Chinese
Association was reported to have taken a similar step.67
In Menglembu (Perak), nine organizations selected thirty-one sub-branch
preparatory committee members,68 while in Teluk Anson, also in Perak, a
conference of Chinese organizations sponsored by the Chinese Association
selected preparatory committee members.69
The MCA’s Penang branch convened the Chinese Organizations’ Repre-
sentatives Convention at the Chinese Chamber of Commerce on March 26,
1949. The convention was attended by representatives of ninety-one organi-
zations, including the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Penang Chinese
Town Hall (Ping Zhang Huiguan, which was renamed Huaren Dahuitang in
1974), and the Straits Chinese British Association. In a vote on whether its
committee members should be selected from individuals or organizations,
twenty-six persons voted for selection from individuals and fifty-eight for
selection from organizations. As a result twenty-five organizations were elected
as committee members.70 In May of that year around a dozen Chinese organi-
zations held a meeting in Tampin (Negeri Sembilan) and formed an MCA
sub-branch preparatory committee.71
The Federation of Kwangtung Associations of Malaya decided to call upon
all of its members to join the MCA at its convention in March 1949.72 The
Federation of Teochew Associations of Malaya, which was established in
1934, also urged all of its affiliated Teochew Associations to join the MCA at
its eleventh convention in August 1949 at which Consul General Wu Paak
Shing gave an address.73
In view of the processes that led to the foundation of the MCA, Heng’s
statement that MCA leaders held major positions in almost every type of Chi-
nese association is simply a reversal of cause and effect. At the initial stage at
least, the Chinese organizations were the basic units of the MCA, and their
leaders participated in the formation of the MCA in their capacity as repre-
sentatives of their organizations. Heng’s implication that only leaders partici-
pated in the MCA is not true. The MCA appears to have had a far broader
membership base than the Democratic Party of Singapore, which was estab-
lished in 1955 with a membership drawn entirely from the leaders of Singapore
Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
The fact that a wide range of Chinese organizations took part in the MCA’s
formation seems to have helped the MCA immensely in its efforts to secure
broad support from the Chinese people. The MCA’s activities also appear to
have been facilitated by the fact that hundreds of thousands of Chinese farm-
ers, who were forced to relocate by the colonial authorities, found themselves
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unable to go along with the growing radicalism of the Malayan Communist
Party, which they had once supported, and thus refrained from entirely reject-
ing Tan Cheng Lock and the MCA under his leadership.
Immediately after its formation, the MCA began rescuing evacuated Chi-
nese farmers and completely took over the role of the consulates. In February
1950, Tan Cheng Lock, as president of the MCA, remarked that the credit for
the change in the colonial authorities’ attitude toward villagers should go to
the MCA. This remark was affirmatively reported by the Xian Dai Ri Bao,
which was affiliated with the pro-CCP China Democratic League.74 These
activities, which were based in effect on approval by the British colonial au-
thorities, were intended primarily to keep farmers away from the influence of
Malayan communists and did not necessarily represent a genuine effort to
rebuild the livelihoods of farmers. Nevertheless, they undeniably helped to
divert the attention of Chinese farmers away from the consulates and China
and toward Malaya.
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